

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

2 APR 1952

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Coast Guard Port Security Problem

Summary (See Chronology of Events Tab A)

1. CIA/IR was delinquent in taking five months to complete its study. (Tab B.)
2. Coast Guard was delinquent in not keeping after ONI for intelligence support.
3. No point in CIA or Coast Guard duplicating extensive Navy intelligence apparatus dealing with ship movements. CIA should, and is feeding to ONI any such intelligence it may obtain, but this is relatively negligible. (Tab C intelligence furnished to Coast Guard to date.) (Tab D specific Coast Guard complaints.)
4. Coast Guard should rely on ONI as its source of ship movement and ship control intelligence preferably by assigning to ONI a qualified intelligence liaison officer with proper security clearances. Such officer could pass to Coast Guard desired intelligence or, where such could not be disseminated, operational instructions based on it.
5. If such support is not satisfactory to the Coast Guard the question of ONI's undertaking further collection or production effort and the budgetary problems raised thereby should be considered at the appropriate policy-making level. Groundwork for this was laid at 23 March conference.

CONFIDENTIAL

Inclosures

Tab A, B, and C and D

ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Assistant Director
Research and Reports

CAD/IR/bh

Distribution:

Orig & 3 - Addressee

DOCUMENT NO. 8

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

IF DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 1990

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

DATE: 4/8/88

REVIEWER: 372044

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

TAB
A

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Tab A

Chronology of Major Developments in which CIA Participated

21 September 1951	Reber conferences following up DCI's promise to assist Coast Guard.
11 October 1951	The EIC Transportation Sub-Committee established a Working Party to review the adequacy of intelligence on merchant shipping activities. The Party consisted of representatives of Navy, Air Force, State, NSA, Commerce and CIA. (The scope of this review was expanded to cover <ul style="list-style-type: none">A. Ship MovementsB. CargoesC. Sales and ChartersD. Ship Construction and Repair)
17 December 1951	A draft paper prepared by the Working Party was reviewed by the TSC and referred back for finalization.
January 1952	The Coast Guard was informed verbally that progress was being made on the Study, and that it should be completed in the near future.
February 1952	Minor revisions held up approval of the paper until 6 March when it was approved by the TSC and forwarded to the EIC with a series of recommendations for improving the intelligence collection effort.
7 March 1952	Representatives of the Treasury and Coast Guard met with the AD/RH, [REDACTED]. The visitors stated that a joint report by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of the Navy would be due at the White House on April 15 to outline progress made on the problem of US Port Security. They pointed out that if the report were to reflect assistance from CIA it would be necessary for CIA to indicate as soon as possible the positive steps to be taken in this respect. An early response setting forth the CIA position was promised.

25X1A

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

11 March 1952 AD/RR asked ONI to schedule meeting to discuss its function in providing intelligence to the Coast Guard. Meeting scheduled for 13 March.

13 March 1952 Admiral Stout cancelled meeting stating ONI would have to study the problem internally before discussing it further with CIA or Coast Guard.

15-25 March 1952 AD/RR repeatedly pressed ONI to get on with the business. 25X1A

23 March 1952 The AD/RR, and [REDACTED] attended a meeting called by Captain Hylant of ONI to consider intelligence support required by Navy and Coast Guard to fulfill their joint responsibility with regard to Port Security. This meeting had been urged by the AD/RR in order to reassure the Coast Guard that effective coordination would take place. Major results of the meeting were a commitment by the Coast Guard to submit a memorandum detailing its requirements for operational intelligence, an agreement by the AD/RR to furnish the ONI with all intelligence hitherto passed to the Coast Guard, and an undertaking by ONI to examine its own available intelligence against the Coast Guard demands and to estimate the extent of additional intelligence effort that would be required to meet the maximum needs asserted by the Coast Guard. It appeared that ONI OP-338 which is now concerning itself with the problem had never been informed of promise allegedly made by the Secretary of the Navy to the Under Secretary of the Treasury to furnish Coast Guard with ship movement intelligence. Moreover, Coast Guard liaison officer to Navy had confined his activities to Operations and had made no requests of ONI.

1 April 1952 CIA/RR delivered copies of promised list of vessels to Captain Hylant and Commander Donald C. Deane, ONI.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

TAB
B

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

TAB A

SHIP MOVEMENT REPORTS

I. Primary sources

A. Lloyd's

1. Shipping Index

- a. Latest known movement of over 35,000 ships including Soviet Bloc vessels.
- b. Published every working day.
- c. No official coverage behind Iron Curtain except in a few Chicom ports.
- d. Except from Chicom and a few isolated ports, coverage is worldwide within 48 hours.
- e. Information presented:

- (1) **Ship's name***
- (2) Registered owner
- (3) Registry (flag)
- (4) Registering society
- (5) Year built
- (6) Gross tonnage
- (7) Net tonnage
- (8) Departure, place and date
- (9) Arrival, place and date
- (10) Latest information, including **casualties if any**

*Type of vessel if a tanker

2. Voyage Supplement

- a. Published weekly.
- b. Contains all arrivals and departures on a current voyage.
- c. Covers about 10,000 ships including Soviet Bloc vessels.
- d. Same area coverage as the Index.
- e. Information presented:

- (1) Ships name*
- (2) Arrivals and departures - place and date - of current voyage
- (3) **Casualties if any**

*Type of vessel if a tanker and flag (country of registry) if more than one ship of same name.

3. Special Reports

- a. Compilations in response to USN requests (liaison in London).
- b. Other miscellaneous reports

B. Naval Attaches, Fleet Intelligence Officers, and DIO's

1. NIRM 2

- a. Detailed dispatch report of Soviet and Satellite ship movements.
- b. No coverage behind Iron Curtain.
- c. Coverage on 24-hour basis.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

- d. Used to report non-Communist ships on a selected basis.
- e. Information presented:

- (1) Ships name
- (2) Flag (registry)
- (3) Call Sign
- (4) Type of vessel
- (5) Gross tonnage
- (6) Port and date of departure
- (7) Port and date of arrival
- (8) Estimated departure date
- (9) Destination and estimated arrival date
- (10) Local agent
- (11) Remarks - cargo, crew, master, etc.

2. 382.2 Reports (F-96 type)

- a. Summaries of movements through or in specific ports or straits.
- b. Special reports.

3. Special dispatch reports.

C. Shipping Control

1. Mereps

- a. Dispatch reports of arrivals and departures in various ports.
- b. Virtual worldwide coverage except behind Iron Curtain.
- c. Coverage approximately on 72-hour basis.
- d. Information presented:

(1) Arrivals

- (a) Port of arrival
- (b) Date of arrival
- (c) Ships name
- (d) Flag (registry)

(2) Departures

- (a) Port of departure
- (b) Date of departure
- (c) Destination
- (d) Ships name
- (e) Flag (registry) if other than U.S.
- (f) Date/time of departure in GCT
- (g) Speed of advance
- (h) Estimated arrival date

2. Special reports in reply to specific requests.

D. Operating Forces (Far East Only)

1. Dispatch reports of ship sightings.

- a. Coverage limited to Far East at present.
- b. Only major source of "at sea" movement reports.
- c. Coverage on 24-hour basis.
- d. Information presented:

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

(1) Initial sighting dispatch reports

- (a) Date and time of sighting (in GCT)
- (b) Latitude
- (c) Longitude
- (d) Course
- (e) Speed
- (f) Type of vessel (in accordance with sighting guide RIG 4.1)
- (g) MPM sequence
- (h) Estimated tonnage
- (i) Flag (registry)

2. Summary Reports

- a. Movement summaries weekly and monthly by sectors within Far East area.
- b. Traffic analyses monthly by sectors within Far East area.

E. State Department (Foreign Service)

1. Telegrams

- a. Corresponds to Navy dispatch reports.
- b. Coverage is roughly the same as NIRM 2.

2. Dispatches

- a. Corresponds to Navy 382.2 (F-9C type) information reports.
- b. Coverage is roughly the same as for 382.2 reports.

II. Secondary Sources

A. CIA

- 1. Some covert coverage behind Iron Curtain.
- 2. Coverage is worldwide but on variable time basis.

B. Army Intelligence (G-2) - virtually no ship movement coverage.

C. Air Force Intelligence (A-2)

1.

25X1A

- a. Very little current info.
- b. Coverage limited to Europe and mostly outdated.

2. Far East Sighting Reports.

STATSPEC

- a. Same as for Navy operating forces reports.
- b. Received mostly through USN=USAF joint activities via USN channels.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

III. Tertiary Sources*

- A. Commerce Department
- B. Coast Guard
- C. NSA

*Note: These sources provide very little on ship movements.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

TAB B

WESTERN FLAG SHIPPING NORMALLY OPERATING INTO STRATEGIC AREAS

White Sea

British
Danish
Finnish
*Greek
Norwegian
*Panamanian
Swedish

Baltic Sea

British
Danish
Dutch
Finnish
French
German
*Greek
Norwegian
*Panamanian
Swedish
US

Black Sea

British
*Greek
Italian
*Panamanian
Turkish

Communist Far East

British
Canadian
Danish
*Greek
Italian
Norwegian
*Panamanian
Philippine

* Largely British owned.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

TAB
C

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

NON-BLOC MERCHANT SHIPS CHARTERED BY USCG-SAP/CHINA DURING 1961

<u>CHARTERED TO</u>	<u>SHIP NAME</u>	<u>G.T.</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>QUARTER CHARTERED IN (APPROX.)</u>
USSR	Graigwen	5997	Br	1-2-3
USSR	Stanrealm	7062	Br	1-2-3
Poland	London Craftman 1/	7579	Br	
Poland	London Banker	7263	Br	1-2-3-4
Poland	Hoperidge	5222	Er	2-3-4
Czech	Greystoke Castle	8028	Br	2-3
C. China	Hydralock	979	Br	1-2-3-4
C. China	Alfa Orange	5196	Br	1-2-3-4
Poland-China	Amerham Hill	7134	Br	2-3
Poland-China	Arundel Hill	7133	Br	3-4
Poland-China	Akti Hill	7161	Br	2-3-4
Poland-China	Mulberry Hill	7141	Br	2-3-4
Poland	Woldingham Hill	7135	Br	2-3
USSR	Tulse Hill	7120	Br	2-3
Poland	Baltara	3294	Br	3
C. China	Plymouth Star 2/	1274	Br	2-3
Poland	Ivor Rita	7153	Br	2
Poland	Othrys	7128	Br	2
C. China	Wiglock	946	Br	1-2-3-4
C. China	Rosita	1800	Br	2-3-4
Poland	Barnhill	7223	Br	2-3
USSR	Andrice	2036	Gr	2-3-4
USSR	Axios	7176	Gr	3
USSR	Elpis	1492	Gr	4

1/ Sold Communist China April 1961

2/ Sold Communist China September 1961

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

2

<u>CHARTERED TO</u>	<u>SHIP NAME</u>	<u>G.T.</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>MONTHS CHARTERED IN (APPROX.)</u>
USSR	Evi Livanos	4839	Gr	3
USSR	Georgios P.	705	Gr	2
USSR	Master Elias			
	Kulukundis	5500	Gr	2
USSR	Belfri	7244	Nor	1
USSR	Bestun	2215	Nor	3
Poland	Blankvann	5391	Nor	1
USSR	Fortun	1695	Nor	4
USSR	Hallbjorg	2864	Nor	3
USSR	Westanden	755	Nor	1
USSR	Lincoln Ellsworth	2483	Nor	3
USSR	Sig	1791	Nor	3
USSR	Spero	4750	Nor	1
Czech	Vollen	500	Nor	2
USSR	Valiant	1791	Nor	4
USSR	Wyvern	4022	Nor	1
USSR	Adelanto	1998	Pan	3
USSR	Archon Michael	4809	Pan	2
USSR	Atlantic Sea	7178	Pan	2
USSR	Electric	4991	Pan	4
USSR	Fortune Star	5022	Pan	3
USSR	Hellenic Nymphs	3345	Pan	3
USSR	Irene	6941	Pan	2
USSR	Maria	5050	Pan	3
USSR	Maracaibo	6599	Pan	2
C. China	Marion	3317	Pan	3
C. China	Morella	7017	Pan	2
USSR	Pan Ocean	5140	Pan	2
USSR	Sparto	7232	Pan	3

SECRET

<u>CHARTERED TO</u>	<u>SHIP NAME</u>	<u>G.T.</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>WARTER CHARTERED IN (APPROX.)</u>
Czech	Asteris	7176	Gr	3
Czech	Chios	5643	Gr	3
USSR	Hermoupolis	2369	Gr	2-3
USSR	Kehrea	7176	Gr	3
USSR	Meandros	7176	Gr	3
Czech	Samos	7176	Gr	3
USSR	Stylianos N.			
	Vlasopoulos	7244	Gr	2
USSR	Thessali	7198	Gr	2
USSR	Hellas	7176	Gr	4
USSR	Pintos	7207	Gr	2
USSR	Mt. Athos	7236	Gr	2
USSR	Daviken	2922	Nor	2
USSR	Balee	2135	Nor	4
USSR	Sandviken	2916	Nor	3
Albania	Elisabeth Mary	2281	Nor	2
USSR	Atlantic Pilot	7176	Pan	3
USSR	Atlantic Wind	7176	Pan	3
Czech	Evanthia	6419	Pan	3
C. China	Moldova	4083	Pan	2
USSR	Molly	1291	Pan	2
USSR	Norina	3451	Pan	2
USSR	Nueva Gloria	7148	Pan	2
USSR	Point Clear	7777	Pan	2
USSR	San Fernando	4441	Pan	2
USSR	Spalmatori	7199	Pan	3
USSR	Vestbay	3402	Pan	2
USSR	Vincent	9457	Pan	2
USSR	Walter	1836	Pan	2
USSR	Ionian Trader	7198	Pan	2

- 4 -

<u>CHARTERED TO</u>	<u>SHIP NAME</u>	<u>G.T.</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>QUANTITIES CHARTERED IN (APPROX.)</u>
USSR	San Jorge	7176	Pan	2
C. China	San Antonio	3971	Pan	2
C. China	Bienvenido	4966	Pan	3
C. China	Maroar	5670	Pan	3
USSR	Atlantic-Trader	7217	Pan	3
C. China	Everagra	3702	Pan	4
USSR	Carluccia Viola	1582	It	3
USSR	Cometa (Tanker)	946	It	2
USSR	Dentice	5445	It	2
Poland	Fiducia	7579	It	2
USSR	Giovi (Tanker)	6117	It	2-3
Poland	Espele	8794	It	2
USSR	Ugo Fiorelli (Tanker)	1820	It	2
USSR	Vildren (Tanker)	721	It	2
USSR	Vittorino Zanibon	1822	It	3
USSR	Nebulosa	644	It	4
USSR	Cristina Maria G.	7453	It	4
USSR	Pietro Canale	1750	It	2
USSR	Patakada	6636	Pak	4
C. China	Kaderbaksh	3107	Pak	3
USSR	Aura	1912	Finn	2
USSR	Inger	1383	Finn	2
USSR	Kirsta	1759	Finn	4
USSR	Hoste (Tanker)	6208	Finn	3
USSR	Pansio (Tanker)	7741	Finn	2
USSR	Wiiri	7381	Finn	2
USSR	Celikel	2532	Turk	1-3
USSR	Museyin Kapitan	5191	Turk	3-4
USSR	Iliri	2677	Turk	4
USSR	K. Sadikoglu	5692	Turk	3

- 5 -

<u>CHARTERED TO</u>	<u>SHIP NAME</u>	<u>G.T.</u>	<u>FLAG</u>	<u>QUARTER CHARTERED IN (APPROX.)</u>
USSR	Musaffer	4949	Turk	1
USSR	Murfan	3155	Turk	8
USSR	Sadiklar	4199	Turk	3
USSR	Selouk	2394	Turk	2
USSR	Taskopru	3434	Turk	3
USSR	Vasaland	4372	Sweden	2
USSR	Aspirator	7210	Lib	2
USSR	Mary	5685	Lib	2
USSR	Panfjord	5298	Dan	4
Czech	Marie Skov	5908	Dan	2-3-4
Czech	Slesvig	3100	Dan	3
USSR	Telamon	7178	Co. RI	3
USSR	Aster	7053	Co. RI	3
USSR	Irusna	2999	Dan	4
Poland	Selling	2733	Dan	4
Poland	Wilke	2529	Finn	1-2-3-4

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

TAB
D

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79S01057A000500080003-7

~~SECRET~~

Excerpts from Memorandum to DD/I from AD/CD, 19 March 1952, Subject: "Liaison with Coast Guard"

"1. Captain Eastman, of the Coast Guard, called upon me yesterday in accordance with a suggestion contained in your memorandum to Admiral O'Neill of 8 February 1952. He informed me as follows:

"2. The merchant vessel ASPIRATOR, included on the list of 129 merchantmen believed to be serving Soviet or Satellite interests, recently put in to Baltimore where she was boarded and inspected by the Coast Guard. Nothing suspicious was found. The skipper was somewhat surprised by the inspection, and stated that the ASPIRATOR is now under charter to Boyd Wair Sewell, Inc. of 24 State Street, New York City. She is loading grain in Baltimore for South America. The skipper said she had made one passage to China, sometime ago.

"Captain Eastman urged that CIA make every effort to keep him up-to-date as to any changes in the list of suspected vessels. Cancellations as well as additions to the list should be reported to him as promptly as possible.

* * *

"4. Captain Eastman also asked why CIA had failed to give him information on the MAI RICKMERS. He said that this vessel had been in Norfolk about 25 February 1952, and would have been inspected if the Coast Guard had known that she was of East German registry and was reported to be operated in fact by the China Export Corporation. Captain Eastman stated that Foreign Assets Control had informed the Coast Guard that it had this information from CIA, and he urged that in future any such information be given simultaneously to the Coast Guard."

* * *

Comments by AD/RR:

1. As to the ASPIRATOR, the reason follow-up information could not be given was special security regulations.

2. Investigation has disclosed that this information was furnished directly by OSO to Foreign Assets Control, but that this was done seven to nine months ago and no one in CRR notified. Steps have been taken to see that this doesn't happen in the future.

~~SECRET~~